Supported malware families for config extraction
Malware configuration extraction is crucial as it provides critical insights into the inner workings of malicious software. By uncovering details such as Command and Control servers, campaign identifiers, and other settings, cybersecurity experts can develop targeted countermeasures. This knowledge empowers them to detect, prevent, and mitigate the impact of malware attacks more effectively. In essence, malware configuration extraction serves as a key tool in fortifying digital defenses against evolving and sophisticated threats.
Our malware configuration extraction system can extract the configuration of over 14 malware families. They can also be searched by tags, listed in the second column of the table below:
Supported malware's name | Tag to search for in MetaDefender Sandbox |
---|---|
Agent Tesla | |
Async RAT | |
Azorult | |
Bitter RAT | |
Caliber | |
Citadel | |
Cobalt Strike | |
DarkCloud stealer | |
Dridex stealer | |
Dynamic RAT | |
Emotet | |
Formbook | |
Hancitor | |
IcedID (BokBot) | |
Knotweed | |
Latrodectus | |
LimeRAT | |
Lumma Stealer | |
njRAT | |
MetaStealer | |
Qakbot | |
RedLine | |
Remcos | |
ReZer0 | |
Roboski | |
Smoke Loader | |
Snake Keylogger | |
Stealc | |
Voldemort | |
Xworm | |
ZLoader |
RedLine malware stands out as one of the most prevalent threats encountered in the wild. This info stealer variant is notorious for its ability to clandestinely gather sensitive information while potentially deploying additional malicious payloads. Its adaptability and widespread availability make it a significant threat, causing financial losses and data exposure for both individuals and businesses. Extracting the malware configuration is of paramount importance as it unveils critical details about RedLine's Command and Control (C2) infrastructure, campaign identifiers, and others significant settings needed to know its behavior. This intelligence enables cybersecurity experts to develop targeted countermeasures, enhancing the capacity to detect, prevent, and mitigate the impact of RedLine attacks.
Let's see how Sandbox can detect a RedLine sample and extract successfully its configuration, being able to extract a new IOC which was previously encrypted.
On the following link you can find the sample from the screenshot below:
